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Executive Summary
Increases in the activity of managed care organizations may have "spilover
effects," influencing the entire health care delivery system's performance, so
that care for both managed-care and nonmanaged-care patients is affected.
Some proposals for Medicare reform have incorporated spillover effects as a
way that increasing Medicare HMO enrollment could contribute to savings for
Medicare.
This paper investigates the relationship between HMO market share and
expenditures for the care of beneficiaries enrolled in traditional fee-for-service
Medicare. We find that increases in systemwide HMO market share (which
includes both Medicare and non-Medicare enrollment) are associated with
declines in both Part A and Part B fee-for-service expenditures. The fact that
managed care can influence expenditures for this population, which should be
well insulated from the direct effects of managed care, suggests that managed-
care activity can have broad effects on the entire health care market. Increases
in Medicare HMO market share alone are associated with increases in Part A
expenditures and with small decreases in Part B expenditures. This suggests
that any spillovers directly associated with Medicare HMO enrollment are
small.
For general health care policy discussions, these results suggest that assess-
ment of new policies that would influence managed care should account not
only for its effects on enrollees but also for its systemwide effects. For Medicare
policy discussions, these findings imply that previous results that seemed to
show large spillover effects associated with increases in Medicare HMO mar-
ket share, but inadequately accounted for systemwide managed-care activity
and relied on older data, overstated the magnitude of actual Medicare
spillovers.
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regarding this research. Address correspondence to Laurence Baker, Department of
Health Research and Policy, HRP Redwood Building, Rm 253, Stanford University
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I.Introduction
As managed care's influence grows, understanding its influence on the
structure and functioning of the health care marketplace is increasingly
important. During recent years, a number of studies have examined
the hypothesis that managed-care activity may broadly affect the entire
health care system through so-called spillover effects. These studies
argue that managed-care organizations may, among other things, com-
pete with nonmanaged-care providers or insurers, influence the sys-
temwide availability of new technologies or other health care services,
influence the structure of hospital markets, and contribute to the
spread of conservative practice patterns among nonmanaged-care
providers, all of which contribute to changes in provider behavior and
health care costs throughout the health care system.
Whether managed care can have widespread effects on health care
delivery and costs is important for assessing the effects of the health
care system's ongoing transformation on health care costs and patient
care and for evaluating policies that would encourage or discourage
growth in managed care. In particular, most analyses of managed care
have focused on patients enrolled in managed care plans, but the
presence of spillover effects would imply the need to include consid-
eration of nonmanaged-care enrollees as well.
This chapter investigates the relationship between systemwide man-
aged care activity and expenditures for the care of patients covered by
Medicare's traditional fee-for-service (FIS) plan. These patients should
be well insulated from managed care's direct effects, so that studying
their expenditures provides a strong test of managed care's ability to
influence care for nonmanaged-care patients. FFS Medicare is a well-
defined, stable insurance plan that does not subject patients to the
limitations managed care plans typically impose. There is little or no
central management of provider or patient utilization choices (i.e.,
utilization review). It imposes no strong financial incentives on provid-
ers to limit utilization. Physicians caring for Medicare FFS patients are
paid on a fee-for-service basis, subject only to limitations on the fees
for individual services embodied in the Medicare Fee Schedule. Hos-
pitals are paid using diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Although DRGs
do impose some incentives for cost containment, they are among the
weaker incentives used to influence hospitals in today's health care
system and, in fact, some work has shown that DRGs do vary with
treatment intensity, so that the incentive for hospitals to reduce inten-
sity to contain costs is not complete (McClellan 1997). In addition, theManaged Care and Health Care Expenditures 119
Medicare FFS program does not compete for patients, and the competi-
tive forces that increasingly pervade the overall health care system
therefore do not influence it. Overall, because FFS Medicare patients
should be well outside the boundaries of managed care, any effect of
managed care on their expenditures may be taken as clear evidence of
managed care's power to transform the health care system fundamen-
tally in ways that affect all patients.
Focusing on Medicare expenditures also allows us to investigate
issues related to Medicare policy. Spillover effects that affect Medicare
spending have attracted particular interest in Medicare reform discus-
sions because policy changes that would increase I-llv1O enrollment
among Medicare beneficiaries could produce spillovers, reducing
Medicare costs and contributing to the savings needed to restore
balance in Medicare financing. The key question is whether changes in
Medicare HMO activity can themselves bring about savings through
spillover effects. Although most examinations of spillover effects focus
on managed-care activity throughout the health care system, the exist-
ence of expenditure-reducing spillover effects induced by HMO activ-
ity outside of Medicare need not imply that changes in Medicare HMO
activity also produce savings. Existing studies that look specifically at
Medicare HMO market share have not fully answered this question,
because they have not clearly identified the effects of Medicare HMO
enrollment separately from systemwide HMO effects. This chapter
studies Medicare HMO market share's effect on expenditures, control-
ling for changes in systemwide FIIVIO activity.
A number of previous studies have examined spillover effects from
various perspectives (e.g., Goldberg and Greenberg 1979; Frank and
Welch 1985; Feldman etal.1986; Luft etal.1986; Dowd 1987;
McLaughlin 1987, 1988; Noether 1988; Robinson 1991, 1996; Baker 1994;
Chernew 1995; Baker and Corts 1996). Although these studies contrib-
ute to our understanding of spillover effects, data limitations have left
them generally unable to draw clear, broad-based conclusions about
systemwide managed-care activity's impact on nonmanaged-care
patients. Some of these studies have been forced to rely on data about
managed care from only a small number of markets. Many have also
had to rely on expenditure data from single sectors of the health care
market (e.g., only from hospitals), which makes generalization dif-
ficult, or have had to lump together spending by managed-care and
non-managed-care patients, which makes it difficult to separate spill-
over effects from managed care organizations' effects on the care
provided to enrollees. This chapter uses detailed nationwide data on120 Laurence C. Baker and Sharmila Shankarkumar
HMO market share along with ambulatory and hospital expenditures
for a well-defined group of FFS patients to overcome these difficulties.
Four studies have examined Medicare data for evidence of spill-
overs. Baker (1997) examined data on Medicare HMO enrollment and
FFS expenditures between 1986 and 1990, finding that increases in
Medicare market share from 10 to 20% were associated with decreases
of 4.5 and 4.1% in FFS expenditures for hospital and physician services,
respectively. Welch (1994) found a negative relationship between
Medicare risk HMO market share and aggregate (HMO and non-
HMO) Medicare expenditures per beneficiary between 1984 and 1987.
Clement, Gleason, and Brown (1992) used data from 1985-88 and
estimated that increases of ten percentage points in Medicare risk
HMO market share were associated with 5% decreases in Medicare FFS
expenditures, although the results were sensitive to specification. Fi-
nally, Rodgers and Smith (1995) reported that increases in Medicare
risk HMO market share were associated with decreases in FFS expen-
ditures between 1988 and 1992. Although these studies offer insights
into the existence of spillover effects in general, their main shortcoming
is that they tend to focus only on Medicare HMO market share1 and
have been unable to clearly distinguish Medicare-specific spillovers
from systemwide spillovers. Nonetheless, some have interpreted their
results to imply that increases in Medicare HMO market share would
lead to declines in Medicare FFS spending (e.g., Rodgers and Smith
1995; Hammonds 1997). In this chapter, we include both systemwide
and Medicare-specific HMO market share to disentangle these two
effects and evaluate this conclusion.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section
discusses how managed care may be expected to influence expendi-
tures and the issues raised when examining managed-care spillovers
in Medicare. Section III discusses estimation issues and presents re-
sults, and section IV concludes.
II. HMOs and Health Care Expenditures
Mechanisms
The term "managed care," in popular parlance, is often poorly defined
and can refer to a wide variety of health care organizations. In this
1. Rodgers and Smith (1995) do include some data on systemwide HMO market share
but are forced to rely on a limited sample of 89 metropolitan areas.Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures 121
chapter, we use this term to refer conceptually to organizations that
take an active role in limiting the providers their patients can use (e.g.,
through selective contracting), that use financial incentives designed to
limit utilization (e.g., capitation), and/or that actively limit patient
utilization through other means (e.g., utilization review). This is a
purposefully broad set of criteria designed to capture the spirit of
recent changes in the health care marketplace. Although this frame-
work guides conceptual development, practical considerations con-
strain the empirical work described below to focus only on HMOs.
Managed care may influence FFS expenditures through a variety of
mechanisms. First, increases in managed-care activity may change the
health care delivery system's structure and capacity. For example,
managed care may change the incentives associated with the purchase
of high-cost medical technologies, affecting technology availability in
markets (Baker and Wheeler 1997; Cutler and Sheiner 1997). Similar
effects could result if managed care changes the structure of the hos-
pital market, the size or behavior of individual hospitals (e.g., Chernew
1995), the number and type of health care providers (Baker and Brown
1997), or other market characteristics. By changing the environment in
which medicine is practiced, managed care may influence the type and
costs of care provided to all patients.
Managed care may also influence health care providers' behavior,
independent of any effects it may have on the overall availability of
services. For example, in markets with high levels of managed-care
activity, all providers may be less likely to use procedures perceived
to have high ratios of costs to benefits. This could occur through a
variety of mechanisms. If, as some models of physician learning sug-
gest (e.g., Phelps 1992), physicians tend to adopt the practice patterns
of other physicians around them, increases in the number of managed-
care physicians practicing in a given area may result in faster promul-
gation of conservative practice techniques. A related possibility is that
physicians who see both managed care and FFS patients may adopt
more conservative practice styles throughout their practices. Finally,
increases in managed-care activity or other increases in the strength of
managed-care organization vis-à-vis traditional providers and insurers
may increase competitive pressure as nonmanaged-care providers
and insurers compete with managed-care organizations for the busi-
ness of employers and patients. Competition could force non-
managed-care providers to change how they provide care or prompt
insurers to expand utilization review and other oversight efforts, lead-
ing to changes in utilization. (It should be noted that competition could122 Laurence C. Baker and Sharmila Shankarkumar
also be associated with increasing expenditures. For example, compe-
tition from managed-care plans may prompt FFS providers to compete
on the basis of quality or technology. O, if managed care pulls patients
away from physicians, they may respond by inducing demand from or
increasing charges to nonmanaged-care patients.2)
A final mechanism by which managed-care activity could have
spillover effects on FFS expenditures is price. If nonmanaged-care
providers or insurers earn excess profits in the absence of managed
care, increasing competition could enhance market discipline and lead
to lower prices.
Observing Spillover Effects in Medicare Data
The Medicare program provides an excellent opportunity to observe
many of the effects described above. In particular, changes in the
health care system's structure and capacity and changes in utilization
patterns should influence Medicare expenditures. Most health care
providers and most hospitals care for both Medicare and non-Medicare
patients. If, for example, managed-care activity reduces the number of
MRI machines available in a market, then utilization of Mifi for Medi-
care patients is likely to be influenced. Similarly, if providers adopt
more conservative practice styles for their non-Medicare patients,
Medicare FFS patients may also be treated more conservatively. Be-
cause Part B reimbursement is based on the number and type of
procedures performed, Part B expenditures will vary with changes in
utilization. Part A expenditures capture variation in the number of
hospitalizations and some variation in in-hospital utilization, although
the Prospective Payment System, which governs Part A payments,
dampens the. relationship between in-hospital utilization intensity and
Part A expenditures.3
A word on the role of competition is important here. Although
competition-driven changes in technology availability or utilization
could easily influence the care Medicare beneficiaries receive, these
Physicians' willingness and abffity to do this is a subject of debate. Some evidence
(e.g., Mitchell, Wedig, and Cromwell 1989; Cromwell and Mitchell 1986) indicates that
physicians can induce demand and may do so in response to reductions in demand or
prices.
Note, however, that McClellan (1997) shows that substantial portions of the variance
in hospital reimbursements under the prospective payment system can be explained by
variation in procedure codes and outlier payments that reflect variation in utilization
patterns, so that Part A expenditures reflect in-hospital intensity to at least some degree.Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures 123
competitive effects are likely to arise from non-Medicare sectors of the
health care market since competition for Medicare beneficiaries is
unlikely to have a strong impact on behavior. Medicare does not
compete for the business of the elderly and disabled and does not
operate under the same incentives that face for-profit insurance com-
panies and health care providers (Clement, Gleason, and Brown 1992).
In addition, provider behavior with respect to pricing and utilization
has only small effects on the prices that Medicare FFS beneficiaries pay
for coverage and care.
Although utilization effects should show up in the Medicare data,
the structure Medicare imposes on the payments made to physicians
and hospitals severely limits the extent to which managed care
induced price changes can occur in Medicare. Since 1983, the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has reimbursed hospitals us-
ing the Prospective Payment System, which significantly limits man-
aged careinduced price variation in Part A expenditures. Similarly, in
the early 1990s, HCFA began phasing in the Medicare Fee Schedule for
reimbursement of physicians under Part B. This schedule limits man-
aged careinduced variation in physician prices. Since the fee schedule
was being phased in during the time period on which we focus, all
data presented here are adjusted to reflect what payments would have
been under the 1994 fee schedule, which further limits the effect that
changes in prices over time could have on our data. However, it
remains theoretically possible that price effects could appear in our
data to the extent that managed careinduced changes in physician or
hospital prices were incorporated into the Prospective Payment Sys-
tem or fee schedule payment rates, although we believe this effect is
relatively weak.
Systemwide Spillovers versus Medicare-Specific Spillovers
For discussions of Medicare policy, it is important to distinguish be-
tween the effects of systemwide and Medicare-specific managed care
activity. "Systemwide" managed-care activity includes changes in the
size, market power, or other aspects of managed-care organizations'
behavior throughout the health care system, possibly including the
effects of increasing managed-care activity within Medicare. "Medi-
care-specific" managed-care activity captures changes in the enroll-
ment in only the Medicare portion of managed-care organizations.
Changes in expenditures induced by Medicare-specific managed-care124 Laurence C. Baker and Sharmila Shankarkumar
activity occur because only Medicare managed-care activity changed,
independent of any other changes in the managed-care market.
Changes in systemwide managed care activity induce expenditure
effects because the entire sector's influence has changed.
If spillovers occur because managed-care activity changes through-
out the entire health care system, then changes in Medicare HMO
enrollment that Medicare policy changes might bring about would
produce spillover effects only to the extent that increases in Medicare
HMO enrollment increase overall enrollment. Because Medicare en-
rollment is only a fraction of overall enrollment, this would limit the
impact increases in Medicare enrollment could have through spil-
lovers. On the other hand, if increases in Medicare HMO market share
itself directly influences expenditures independent of systemwide
changes in market share, savings obtained could be greater.
It is not clear that the effects of systemwide and Medicare-specific
HMO market share should be the same. Systemwide changes in man-
aged-care activity have broad latitude in how they influence expendi-
tures. In fact, all of the spillover effect mechanisms identified above
could plausibly begin with systemwide managed care changes. On the
other hand, Medicare-specific spifiovers have much more limited po-
tential to have strong effects (Clement, Gleason, and Brown 1992; Baker
1997). There is little reason to believe that Medicare-specific activity
would bring about large changes in the overall health care market's
structure and capacity or have important competitive effects. Sig-
nificant Medicare-specific effects could occur most plausibly through
learning and related effects. For example, if providers who see elderly
or disabled patients share information among themselves but not with
other physicians more generally, then increases in Medicare managed-
care activity could change the behavior of Medicare FFS providers
independent of changes in the non-Medicare market.
Although understanding Medicare-specific spillover effects is crucial
for Medicare policy, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the size of
Medicare-specific spillover effects from previous work. Because sys-
temwide and Medicare-specific spillovers need not be the same, infer-
ences cannot reliably be drawn from studies of spifiover effects outside
of Medicare. Although some studies have examined the effects of
Medicare 1-IMO market share on expenditures (Baker 1997; Welch
1994; Clement, Gleason, and Brown 1992; Rodgers and Smith 1995),
they have not typically included systemwide FIMO activity. Since
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correlated, the relationship between HMO market share and expendi-
tures could capture the effects of both Medicare-specific and system-
wide managed-care activity. One goal of this chapter is to apply new
data to attempt to disentangle these effects.
III. Data
Medicare Expenditures
Data on Part A and Part B Medicare FFS expenditures and enrollment
by county for all counties in the United States for 1990-94 were
obtained from HCFA. The expenditure data include only expenditures
made on behalf of FFS beneficiaries4payments to HMOs and other
providers for the care of HMO-enrolled beneficiaries are not included.
The data also exclude expenditures Medicare does not cover, such as
copayments, deductibles, payments made for services not covered by
Medicare, and payments for services covered by Medigap insurance.
To construct the county-level measures of spending, expenditures for
each beneficiary are assigned to his or her county of residence, regard-
less of where the expenditures were incurred.
The Medicare Fee Schedule governing Medicare payments to physi-
cians was phased in during the time period under study here. To
ensure that this does not affect the findings, the HCFA Office of the
Actuary has adjusted the data for each year to reflect what payments
in each year would have been under the 1994 Medicare Fee Schedule.
This adjustment virtually eliminates the (already small) possibility of
observing managed care-induced changes in physician prices.
For our analyses, we aggregate the county-level data to produce
measures of spending for Health Care Service Areas (HCSAs): groups
of counties thought to approximate markets for health services (Makuc
et al. 1991). There are 802 HCSAs in the United States, representing
both urban and rural areas. We expect HCSAs to be superior to
counties as a market definition, because many counties are too small
to represent adequately markets for health care services.
Table 4.1 reports national average expenditures per beneficiary for
1990-94. In 1990, on average, Medicare spent $2,037 per beneficiary for
4. The sample includes expenditures for the elderly and disabled but excludes expen-
ditures for patients with end-stage renal disease, who are also covered by Medicare but
make up less than 1% of beneficiaries and tend to have distinct health needs.126 Laurence C. Baker and Sharmila Shankarkumar
Table 4.1
Mean nominal Medicare FF5 expenditures per beneficiary, 1990-1994
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Values shown are national averages.
Part A services and $1,233 per beneficiary for Part B services. By 1994,
these amounts had risen to $2,865 and $1,539, increases of 40.6% and
24.8%, respectively.
Medicare FIMO Market Shares
Although the arguments developed above apply to managed care
broadly, we focus our analytical efforts on HMO market share. This
follows previous work and is, in practice, the only variable for which
we can obtain comparable data over time for relatively small geo-
graphic areas. County-level data on the number of Medicare Part A
beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs for 1989-94 (includirg risk, cost, and
HCPPs) were obtained from HCFA.5 County-level HMO market shares
are simply the ratio of the number of HMO enrollees to the number of
beneficiaries in each county.
As above, we aggregate the county-level data to form measures of
Medicare HMO market share for market areas. The top panel of table
4.2 presents summary statistics for area Medicare HMO market shares
5. Although some previous analyses have used only risk HMO enrollment, this does
not capture HMO activity as broadly or accurately as HMO market share from all
contract types. Moreover, focusing only on risk enrollment may induce bias because
Medicare HIVIOs can choose annually whether to operate as risk or cost plans, and FFS
expenditure levels are likely to influence this choice.
Year Part A
% change from





1991 $2,152 5.6% $1,273 3.2%
(547) (338)
1992 $2,432 13.0% $1,322 3.8%
(557) (324)
1993 $2,616 7.6% $1,397 5.7%
(645) (367)
1994 $2,865 9.5% $1,539 10.2%
(701) (361)
% change 1990-94 40.6% 24.8%Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures 127
Table 4.2
Summary statistics for HMO market share measures
Note: Sample size is 802 Health Care Services Areas per year. Weighted means reflect
nationwide population averages-weighted Medicare market share measures are weighted
by Medicare enrollment, and weighted systemwide market shares are weighted by county
population.
by year. The first column presents means weighted by the number of
Medicare beneficiaries in each market area to produce national aver-
ages. Between 1990 and 1994, mean Medicare HMO market share grew
from 6.4% to 7.8%. Since 1994, Medicare HMO market share has
continued to grow, reaching approximately 10% in 1996.
Figure 4.1 graphs the distribution of 1994 levels and 1990-94 changes
in Medicare market shares. 1994 market shares in the sample range
from 0 to 47%. Medicare market shares have a highly skewed distribu-
tion, as evidenced by the fact that the median market shares are all well
below the means. Between 1990 and 1994, Medicare HMO market
share changed little in most areas. Among market areas in the sample,
1990-94 changes ranged from --9% to +27%. There was some upward
movement in HMO market share in some areas, but most experienced
only very small changes in market share. In this sample 1.0 percent
(N=8) had decreased of more than 5%, 4.2% (N=34) had increases of














Medicare HMO market share
1990 6.4 2.3 5.4 0.1 0.3 1.5 6.8
1991 5.7 2.1 4.8 0.1 0.3 1.4 5.6
1992 6.0 2.2 5.0 0.2 0.3 1.5 5.9
1993 6.8 2.4 5.6 0.2 0.4 1.5 6.6
1994 7.8 2.8 6.2 0.2 0.4 2.0 7.7
Systemwide HMO market share
1990 15.1 5.9 8.1 0 2.5 8.8 16.2
199115.7 6.1 8.3 0 2.6 9.5 16.2
199216.7 6.7 8.8 0.2 3.2 10.3 17.4
199318.2 7.5 9.3 0.5 4.1 11.2 18.9














Distribution of 1994 levels of Medicare HMO market share
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Figure 4.lb
1990-1994 changes in Medicare HMO market share
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Systemwide HMO Market Shares
In addition to Medicare HMO market shares, we also incorporate
estimates of systemwide (Medicare and non-Medicare) HMO market
share. These estimates were constructed for previous studies using
data from the Group Health Ass6ciation of America (now called the
American Association of Health Plans). Conceptually, construction
took place in three steps. First, the total enrollment and service area,
specified by county, of each HIVIO in the United States were obtained
from annual surveys conducted by the GHAA that asked all known
HMOs in the country about their total enrollment, county service area,
and headquarters location. The results of the survey were published in
the annual National Directory of HMOs.6
Next, the enrollment of each HMO was distributed among the
counties in its service area. Initially, enrollment was simply distributed
proportionally to county population. In addition, because HMO enroll-
ment may be concentrated near HMO headquarters or because HMOs
may locate their headquarters in areas where their enrollment is con-
centrated, estimates that incorporate both county population and dis-
tance from HMO headquarters were constructed. Estimates produced
by the two methods have a correlation of approximately 0.97. Esti-
mates that incorporate both population and distance were used in this
study.
Finally, once enrollments had been distributed over service areas,
the total number of enrollees in each county was computed by sum-
ming over the set of HMOs serving that county. Using the set of county
enrollment estimates, market share estimates were computed as the
proportion of the population enrolled in HMOs.
Since the county service areas on which the series are based are quite
accurate, it is likely that the series themselves are also quite accurate.
Nonetheless, use of any allocation mechanism that produces enroll-
ment estimates will almost certainly lead to measurement error in
some cases. Aggregating market shares to the HCSA level should
6. In general, compliance with the survey is quite good. In all five of the years taken
together, fewer than ten HMOs (of a total of about 550 per year) failed to indicate their
enrollment. Where data was missing, data from subsequent Directories was used. Most
HMOs also indicated their service area. In 1990, 459 of 567 HMOs clearly indicated the
counties that they served. Response rates improved over time, and by 1994, 566 of 572
HMOs reported their service area clearly. In cases where market area data was not
available from the survey, market areas were determined by reference to subsequent
Directories and/or telephone contact.130 Laurence C. Baker and Sharmila Shankarkumar
dampen the effects of any misestimation of market shares that may
have occurred at the county level. Although geographically detailed
independent data on HMO market share for the whole country for
these years are not available, the estimates were compared to estimates
for selected sets of metropolitan statistical areas from the GHAA for
1991 (Bergsten and Paisbo 1993) and from Interstudy for 1994 (In-
terstudy 1994). The estimates performed relatively well in these com-
parisons. In a few cases, the estimates were found to be at odds with
the Interstudy estimates, and where the geographic allocation algo-
rithm appeared to produce erroneous results, we adjusted the esti-
mates to conform to the Interstudy estimates.
On average, systemwide HMO market shares rose from 15 to 21%
between 1990' and 1994 (bottom panel of table 4.2). Within any given
year, observed systemwide market shares were fairly widely distrib-
uted. For example, in 1994, observed market shares ranged from 0 to
54%. Figure 4.2(a) illustrates the distribution of systemwide HMO
market shares across market areas in 1994. Between 1990 and 1994,
systemwide HMO market shares rose in most areas. Figure 4.2(b)
graphs the distribution of changes in systemwide market share for
areas. Systemwide HMO market share changes in the sample range for
1990-94 from 14% to +22%. HMO market share declined in relatively
few areas. About 1.0% (N=8) of the sample had declines of more than
5%. On the other hand, 27% (N=219) had increases of more than 5%.
An issue that becomes important as we attempt to disentangle the
effects of systemwide and Medicare-specific HMO market share on
Medicare expenditures is the extent to which the two measures are
correlated. In cross sections for individual years, correlations between
the market area estimates range from 0.52 to 0.54. The correlation




Our interest is in estimating the parameters of a function that relates
FFS Medicare expenditures in a market to HMO market share in that
market. Specifically,
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1990-1994 changes in systemwide FHvIO market share
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where F denotes Medicare FFS expenditures, M denotes Medicare-
specific HMO activity, S denotes systemwide HMO activity, and X
denotes other determinants of Medicare expenditures.
Several issues must be resolved to satisfactorily estimate equation
(4.1). First, unobservable variables may be correlated with both market
share and expenditures. For example, preferences of patients and
providers for conservative care might increase HMO market share and
decrease expenditures. Unobserved components of the population's
health status may also influence both market share and expenditures.
Although we control in the analyses for a number of potential con-
founding factors that we have been able to identify, we may not have
identified all confounders. We attempt to solve this problem by includ-
ing fixed effects in our models for areas and years. If the unobserved
factors are constant within areas over time or are constant within years
across areas, inclusion of the fixed effects removes any resulting bias
from our estimates. In effect, this approach identifies the effects of
HMO market share using changes within areas over time rather than
variation in HMO activity across areas within individual years.
Second, 1-IMO market share and expenditures may be simultane-
ously determined. Forward-looking HMOs may consider both current
and expected future expenditures when deciding whether to enter or
expand operations in a market. HMOs that can effectively reduce costs
or utilization may be most successful in markets where FFS expendi-
tures are high. Previous studies (e.g., Porell and Wallack 1990; Welch
1984; Goldberg and Greenberg 1981) have concluded that overall HMO
market share is positively related to health care costs and utilization.
Within the context of Medicare, the fact that payments to risk HMOs
are dependent on FFS spending levels could also generate simultaneity
bias. Areas with high FFS expenditures also have high risk HMO
reimbursement rates, which may attract HMOs serving Medicare
beneficiaries. If increases in FFS expenditures cause increases in HMO
market share, then estimates of HMOs' effect on expenditures that do
not account for simultaneity understate any expenditure-reducing ef-
fect HMOs may have.
We expect that the use of fixed effects in our analyses alleviates the
difficulties associated with simultaneity to a large degree. Relying on
changes over time to identify the effect of FIMOs removes the bias
induced by high expenditure levels causing high HMO market share
levels. However, some bias could remain if expected future changes in
expenditures prompt changes in market share. Previous work suggestsManaged Care and Health Care Expenditures 133
that the conclusions drawn from fixed-effects models are broadly
consistent with results from cross-sectional models that rely on instru-
mental variables to remove more fully simultaneity and omitted vari-
ables bias (Baker 1997). Further, given that previous work suggests that
increases in expenditures should be associated with increases in HMO
market share, any expenditure-reducing effects of HMO market share
identified below can be interpreted as conservative to the extent that
some simultaneity bias persists. Finally, any simultaneity bias induced
through the Medicare risk HMO payment mechanism will influence
only our estimates of the effects of Medicare-specific HMO enrollment;
controlling for Medicare HMO market share should leave estimates of
the effects of systemwide HMO activity unaffected by this source of
bias.
Finally, the possibility of biased selection is an issue for estimation.
Many studies have found that HMOs and other managed-care organi-
zations receive a favorable selection of beneficiaries (see, among others,
Hellinger 1987, 1995; Hill and Brown 1990). Given this evidence, selec-
tion bias is expected to associate increases in Medicare HMO market
share with increases in FFS expenditures, because moving healthy
beneficiaries into Medicare HMOs leaves the Medicare FFS population
progressively sicker and therefore more expensive. Geographically
detailed data on the characteristics of Medicare FFS and HMO bene-
ficiaries are not available, so we are unable to control directly for the
effects of biased selection. However, all of the relevant selection activ-
ity should occur with respect to Medicare HMOs, meaning that the
Medicare HMO market share variables capture selection bias. Thus,
controlling for Medicare HMO market share will leave our estimates
of the effects of systemwide HMO market share unaffected by selec-
tion, but our estimates of the relationship between Medicare HMO
market share and expenditures reflect selection bias as well as any
spillover effects.
Results
We begin by estimating fixed-effects regression models of the form
log(Et) = 13o + + Ii2S2j,t + + + i35X,
+ + +
where log(E) represents the natural logarithm of FFS expenditures per
beneficiary, M represents Medicare HMO market share, S represents
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systemwide HMO market share, X is a vector of covariates expected to
influence expenditures, A is a set of area-specific intercepts, and Y is a
set of year-specific intercepts. The errors, Ej,t, are assumed to be inde-
pendently and identically distributed normal random variables. Sub-
script i denotes area i and subscript t denotes year t.
We estimate these models using current market share data. Most
previous studies have used lagged data because HMO activity may
have an effect on FFS expenditures only after a period of time. But
because systemwide HMO market share estimates are available only
for 1990-94, using current market share allows us to maximize the
number of years in our sample. The year-to-year correlation in HMO
market share is quite high, and estimation using lagged market shares
and dropping 1990 data from the analysis does not significantly affect
the estimates.
To capture changes in HMO market share's effect on expenditures
as the level of HMO activity varies, equation (4.2) is quadratic in HMO
market share. Previous work has explored various nonlinear functional
forms and suggests that a quadratic specification adequately captures
the relevant variation. We estimate equation (4.2) using our market
area data, excluding the market area that contains Delta, Gunnison,
Montrose, Hinsdale, Ouray, and San Miguel counties in Colorado,
which experienced an implausibly high drop in systemwide HMO
market share between 1990 and 1994, as well as Alaska and Hawaii.
The final models use 801 observations per year (N=4,005).
We estimate separate models for Part A and Part B expenditures
because differences in the content and reimbursement of ambulatory
and hospital care may cause the effect of HMOs to vary. To correct for
possible heteroskedasticity arising from variation in enrollments across
markets and to maintain consistency with previous work, weighted
least-squares regression was used, with Medicare Part A enrollment as
the weight.
The control variables include per capita income; the proportions of
the population aged 65-74, 75-84, and 85 and over; and the propor-
tions of the over-65 population that are female, black, and "other race"
(i.e., nonwhite and nonblack). To control for broad characteristics of
the health care system that may influence expenditures, we include the
number of physicians per 1,000 population and the number of hospital
beds per 1,000 population. All these variables were obtained from the
Census Bureau or from the Area Resource File, a dataset from the U.S.
government Bureau of Health Professions that compiles health careManaged Care and Health Care Expenditures 135
data from a variety of sources including the AMA, the AHA, and the
Census Bureau. The inclusion of area- and year-specific intercepts
captures the effects of additional area- and year-specific unobserved or
omitted variables.
Table 4.3 shows estimation results. Columns 1 and 4 present coeffi-
cients from the main specification. Note that the coefficients have been
scaled to represent the effect of a ten-percentage-point change in mar-
ket share (e.g., moving from 10% to 20% market share). To assess the
statistical significance of the estimated relationships, F tests of the
hypotheses that the linear and quadratic market share terms are jointly
equal to zero were conducted separately for systemwide and Medicare
market share. In all cases, the results were highly statistically sig-
nificant.
For most practical purposes, we are concerned with the magnitude
of the change in expenditures that would accompany a given change
in market share. We estimate the percentage change in expenditures
that would be associated with some representative changes in system-
wide and Medicare HMO market share using the regression results.
Specifically, the ratio of expenditures at system-wide market share S2
to expenditures at system-wide market share Si can be estimated
using:
Es2/Esi = exp(logEs2 - logEsi)
= exp(3i(S2 - S1) + f3 2(S22 - S12)).
where lôgEsi and lôgEs2 are the predicted values of log (E) at system-
wide market shares Si and S2, respectively.7 The quantity (Es2/Esi -
1) can then be interpreted as the approximate percentage change in
expenditures that would be associated with a move from market share
Si to S2. A similar equation can be used for Medicare market share
changes, substituting the appropriate estimates from equation (4.2).
The top panel of table 4.4 shows the estimated percentage changes in
expenditures associated with moving systemwide HMO market share
from 10 to 20, 20 to 30, and 30 to 40%. Estimates of the effect of moving
HMO market share higher than 40 percent are not computed because
there are relatively few sample points in that range.
Increases in systemwide HMO activity are associated with decreases
in Part A expenditures. In the main specification (column 1), increases
(4.3)
7. Technically, this formula assumes that expenditures are log-normally distributed. Our











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8138 Laurence C. Baker and Sharmila Shankarkumar
in systemwide HMO market share from 10 to 20% are associated with
1.9% reductions in expenditures. Evaluated at the 1994 mean expendi-
ture per beneficiary ($2,865), this corresponds to a decrease of $54.44.
As HMO market share increases, an increase has a larger effect on
expenditures. For example, increases in systemwide HMO market
share from 20 to 30% are associated with 2.5% reductions in expendi-
tures ($71.63 evaluated at the mean).
Increases in systemwide HMO market share are also associated with
decreases in Part B expenditures (column 4). Increases in systemwide
market share from 10 to 20% are associated with 1.7% decreases in
expenditures. At mean 1994 expenditure levels ($1,539), this would
correspond to a decrease of $26.16. Increases in HMO market share
have weaker effects as HMO market share rises, but only to a limited
degree. Increases in systemwide HMO market share from 20 to 30 or
from 30 to 40% are associated with decreases of 1.7 and 1.6% percent,
respectively, in Part B expenditures.
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that systemwide
HMO activity can influence the health care system in ways that affect
expenditures for all patients. The evidence presented here is stronger
than that found in previous studies because we have accounted for
selection bias by including Medicare HMO market share as a control
variable and for unobserved heterogeneity across markets by including
market fixed effects.
Interpreting the results in tables 4.3 and 4.4 for Medicare-specific
market share is less straightforward because the systemwide HMO
market share variables include Medicare HMO market share along
with non-Medicare HMO market share. To investigate the effect of a
change in Medicare I-fMO market share independent of any effects of
systemwide market share, we could use the regression coefficients13
and f3directly. But to assess fully the effects of a change in Medicare
HMO market share, we must account for the effects of Medicare
market share alone (through 133 and 134) as well as the effects of Medi-
care market share that occur through systemwide market share (cap-
tured in 13i and 132). Appendix A presents the equations necessary to do
this. Table 4.4 summarizes the implied changes in expenditures asso-
ciated with representative changes in market share using just the
Medicare market share coefficients (the "independent" effect) and the
implied changes in expenditures when both Medicare and systemwide
effects are included (the "total" effect).Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures 139
Increases in market share are associated with relatively large in-
creases in Part A expendituresindependently,increases in Medi-
care HMO market share from 10 to 20% areassociated with 9.4%
increases in expenditures. Increases in market share are independently
associated with decreases in Part B expenditures for market shares
above about 7%. Increases in market share from 10 to 20% are associ-
ated with decreases of 0.7%. In both cases, the total effects are quite
similar
Drawing conclusions about the existence and magnitudeof Medi-
care-specific spillover effects from these results is complicated by the
fact that the coefficients capture the effects of biased selection and
simultaneity, which are expected to associate increases in HMO market
share with increases in expenditures, along with any expenditure-
reducing spillovers. Thus, the results for Part A suggest that any
spillover effects associated with Medicare HMO market share are
much smaller than the effects of selection bias and simultaneity.For
Part B, the results imply that there may be spillover effectslarge
enough to offset the effects of selection bias and simultaneity.
To examine the robustness of the results, two alternate specifications
of the basic equation were estimated. First, because many areas had
very low Medicare HMO market shares,equation (4.2) was reesti-
mated using only data from 522 HCSA market areas in which market
share exceeded 1% in all years examined (columns 2 and 5 of tables 4.3
and 4.4). Second, equation (4.2) was reestimated using data at the
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level. MSAs are an alternative to
HCSAs as a market definition and have been used by other authors,
although they do not permit the inclusion of nonmetropolitan areas
(columns 3 and 6 of tables 4.3 and 4.4). In both cases, the results are
consistent with those reported above.
In addition to the models shown in tables 4.3 and 4.4, we tested
several other specifications to examine the robustness of the results
reported. We estimated equation (4.2) using unweighted least-squares
regression, using lagged rather than current HMO market sharesand
dropping 1990, and excluding the number of short-term acute care
hospital beds per 1,000 population and the number of physicians per
1,000 population in the area, because I-lIMO marketshare may
influence these variables, which could cause us to understate HMO
activity's true effect. In all cases, the results were similar to the results
initially obtained.140 Laurence C. Baker and Sharmila Shankarkumar
Comparison to Earlier Work
Four previous studies have examined the relationship between Medi-
care HIvlO market share and Medicare FFS expenditures. Table 4.5
summarizes the percentage changes in Medicare F1S expenditures
estimated in these studies to accompany ten-percentage-point in-
creases in Medicare market share. For Part A, previous studies sug-
gested that expenditure decreases of 1.3 to 6.6% wouldaccompany
such increases, with most estimates toward the higher end of that
range. For Part B, estimates ranged from 1.4 to 12.1% decreases. The
results we present suggest that increases in Medicare HMO market
share are associated with increases in Part A spending. The estimated
declines in Part B spending that we report are generally much smaller
than those reported in previous work.
Previous results and the results presented here could differ because
our data is newer or because the model specified here differs from
specifications in earlier studies (e.g., because we include both system-
wide and Medicare market share). To present some information about
Table 4.5
Main estimates from previous studies of the percentage reductions in Medicare FFS spend-
ing accompanying ten-percentage-point increases in Medicare HMO market share
Effect of a ten-percentage-point increase in
Medicare 1-IMO market share on
Years Part A Part B All
Study examinedexpendituresexpendituresexpenditures
Baker 1997 1986-90 6a -4.1, _56a
Rodgers and Smith 19951988-92 _48b 121b 79b
Welch 1994 1986-87 13c 14c
Clement, Gleason, and 1985-88 _5d
Brown 1992
allaker (1997) estimateda nonlinear specification. Results shown here are for moves from
10 to 20 and from 20 to 30% market share, respectively.
bmese figuresare taken from the "Net FJMO penetration rate effect" row in table 7 of the
study.
CThese are Welch's short-run estimates. Heargues that the long-run effects of a change in
market share may be much larger. Only the estimate for Part B expenditures is statistically
significant at the p=O.O5 level. (The estimate for all expenditures is significant at the p=O.lO
level.)
dTheseare the main results, as transmitted in the project's final report. Other specifications
presented in the paper produce a range of similar results.Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures 141
these two alternatives, we have estimated two additional models. First,
we replicated the specification used above eliminating the systemwide
HMO market share variables. Columns I and 3 of table 4.6 show these
results. Here, the implied increases in Part A expenditures are some-
what smaller than those observed with systemwide HMO market
share included (cf. table 4.4). For Part B expenditures, the results
suggest larger declines in expenditures. Together these results suggest
that when systemwide HMO market share is omitted from the spe-
cification, the Medicare HMO market share variables capture some of
its expenditure-reducing effect and may overstate the size of associated
cost decreases or understate the size of associated cost increases.
Table 4.6








Medicare HMO market share 0.096
/10 (0.012)




F[df] (market share) 79.84
[2, 3189]
P(F) 0.000
Implied percentage changes in
ket share
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Moving from 20 to 30%
































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
expenditures per beneficiary. Columns I and 3 replicate the specification used in table 4.3,
except that systemwide HlvIO market share is excluded. Columns 2 and 4 replicate the
specification used in Baker 1997. In columns 2 and 4, Medicare HMO market share is lagged
one year. Regressions also contain controls for area population demographics, year dum-
mies, and an intercept. Regressions in columns 1 and 3 also include physicians and hospital
beds per capita. The F statistics shown test the hypotheses that the coefficients on the linear
and quadratic market share temis are jointly zero. Regressions are weighted by Medicare
enrollment.
expenditures from representative changes in HMO mar-
+8.3 +5.4 -1.2 -3.8
+7.4 +4.8 -2.0 -4.0
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To investigate the effect of using newer data, we have also replicated
the specification used in Baker 1997, which included only Medicare
HMO market share and was originally run using data from 1986-90,
using our data from 1990-94. This specification is similar to that used
above but differs in three ways: The models are estimated at the
county, rather than the HCSA, level;8 lagged HMO market share is
used instead of current; and the variables measuring the number of
physicians and hospital beds per capita are not included. Columns 2
and 4 of table 4.6 present results. Here, increases in Medicare market
share from 10 to 20% are associated with 5.4% increases in Part A
expenditures. Results using data from 1986-90 showed that Part A
expenditures fell by 4.5% for the same increase in market share. Com-
paring these results suggests that the relationship between HMO mar-
ket share and expenditures may have changed over time and that the
differences between the findings reported above and those in previous
studies may stem both from changes in the specifications and changes
over time. For Part B expenditures, 1990-94 data imply that increases
in FIMO market share from 10 to 20% are associated with declines of
3.8% percent, whereas 1986-90 data implied that increases in market
share from 10 to 20% were associated with 4.0% decreases. These
results suggest that, for Part B, the differences between the findings
here and the earlier findings are more closely related to changes in the
specification and the inclusion of systemwide market share than to
changes over time.
An Alternate Specification
The models described above rely on changes in HMO market share
and expenditures over time to identify the effects of HMO market
share. Although this approach has powerful statistical properties,
allows us to incorporate five years of data, and is consistent with
previous studies, it does not incorporate the baseline levels of expen-
ditures and HMO market share. Thus, it does not permit us to investi-
gate the possibility that initial levels of HMO activity may influence
the subsequent growth rate of expenditures. If areas with initially high
levels of HMO market shares had slower expenditure growth, for
8. We exclude from the analyses counties with fewer than 50 beneficiaries in any of the
years. The final sample included 3,074 counties per year (N=15,370).Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures 143
The observed (weighted) correlation between the 1990 systemwide market share and
the 1990-94 change is 0.23; for Medicare market share, the correlation is 0.41.
The observed (weighted) correlations between the log of mean 1990 expenditures
and the 1990-94 changes in log expenditures are 0.36 for Part A and 0.64 for Part B.
example, fixed-effects models that essentially difference out the base-
line market share levels would not capture this effect. Of particular
concern is the possibility that initial levels of HMO market share may
also be associated with the subsequent growth rate of HMO market
share.9 If initial HMO market share is associated with both expenditure
growth and HMO market share growth, then fixed-effects models may
lead to inaccurate estimates of the effects of changes in HMO activity.
To account for both initial levels of HMO activity and changes over
time, we estimate first-differenced models of the form
log(E,94) - log(E,,90) = f3o + f3iS,90 + J32(S,94 - S,90) + 133LVI,90
+ l34(M,94 - M,90) + I35Q1i,90 + f36Q4i,90 (4.4)
+ 37X,,90 + - X,90) + 'rfl.
That is, this specification models the difference in log expenditures
between 1990 and 1994, which is approximately equal to the percent-
age change in expenditures over that time, as a function of the initial
levels of HMO market share and the 1990-94 changes in market share.
We include in X the same set of covariates as above to control for
population and health system characteristics, and we add the percent-
age of the population in each market that lives in an urban area to
capture urban-rural differences.
Equation (4.4) is estimated using the market area (HCSA) data. As
above, we exclude Alaska, Hawaii, and the Colorado HCSA that
appears to have inaccurate systemwide HMO market share data. We
do not include quadratic terms in the market shares, because this
makes the equation unwieldy and does not add substantially to the
conclusions. We weight the regressions using the 1990 Medicare HMO
enrollment in each market area.
A potential difficulty with estimating equation (4.4) is that in areas
with particularly high or low expenditures in a given year, expendi-
tures may regress to the mean over time. For example, if an area has
high expenditures in one year because of particularly bad health out-
comes in its population, it is likely to have lower health expenditures
in subsequent years because the health outcomes the area population
experiences are likely to fall more near the mean.10 If managed-care144 Laurence C. Baker and Sharmila Shankarkumar
organizations disproportionately locate in high-expenditure areas,
then the resulting association between HMO market share and sub-
sequent regression to the mean in expenditures could produce biased
estimates of HMO's effects. The variables QI and Q4 in equation (4.4)
are dummy variables indicating whether the market area was in the
highest or lowest expenditure quartile in 1990 and are intended to
capture the effects of regression to the mean.
Table 4.7 presents estimation results. The models in columns 1 and
3 do not control for the initial level of expenditures; the models in
columns 2 and 4 do. For Part A, the coefficients on the initial level of
systemwide market share are statistically insignificant. However,
growth in systemwide market share over time is associated with lower
expenditure growth. With controls for initial expenditure levels in-
cluded, 10-percentage-point increases in systemwide market share are
associated with 4.3-percentage-point reductions in expenditure growth
rates. At least in this context, changes in HMO activity are more
important than the initial level in determining spending growth.
The story is reversed for Medicare HMO market share. Although the
initial level of Medicare market share is not significant, the results
imply that 10-percentage-point increases in Medicare market share are
associated with 4.5-percentage-point increases in the spending growth
rate. These results, like those presented above, suggest that selection
and simultaneity bias effects may outweigh any Medicare-specific
spillovers.
For Part B, the initial level of systemwide HMO market share is
again insignificant, but increases in market share over time are associ-
ated with decreases in expenditure growth rates. With the controls for
the initial level of spending included, a 10-percentage-point increase in
systemwide market share would reduce the expenditure growth rate
by 1.1 percentage points. Both the initial level of Medicare HMO
market share and the 1990-94 change in Medicare market share are
associated with decreases in expenditures. Ten-percentage-point in-
creases in the initial market share level are associated with 2.0-percent-
age-point reductions in expenditure growth, and 10-percentage-point
increases over time are associated with 2.8-percentage-point reduc-
tions, suggesting spillover effects directly associated with Medicare
HMO market share may be strong enough to overcome positive effects
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V. Discussion
We draw two sets of conclusions from these results. First, increases in
systemwide HMO market share reduce expenditures for the care of
Medicare FFS beneficiaries, a population that should be well-insulated
from the direct effects of managed care. Increases in systemwide mar-
ket share from 10 to 20% were associated with decreases of 1.9 to 2.3%
in Part A expenditures and 1.2 to 1.7% in Part B expenditures. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that managed care can have significant
spilover effects that broadly influence the entire health care system's
structure and functioning.
Given Medicare's structure, we believe that these findings largely
reflect spillover effects that occur through the availability and use of
health care services. For example, Baker and Wheeler (1997) report that
increases in HMO market share are associated with a decline in the
systemwide availability of MRI equipment. Cutler and Sheiner (1997)
also report that areas with high levels of HMO activity may have
reduced technology availability. Reductions in the general availability
of health care equipment and technologies may translate into reduced
systemwide use, providing a mechanism for reductions in spending.
Increases in HMO market share may also lead to changes in health care
providers' behavior independent of any changes in the availability of
services.
By extrapolation, these results believe that managed care may also
influence the care provided to nonmanaged-care patients outside of
Medicare. In fact, because the Medicare FFS program is not subject to
the competition that pervades the non-Medicare sector of the health
care market, and because spillover effects that occur through changes
in price are not likely to be observed in Medicare data, spillover effects
in other sectors of the health care market might even be larger.
From a policy standpoint, these results suggest that managed care's
systemwide effects should be considered when assessing the ongoing
shift toward managed care and that the interests of nonmanaged-care
patients should be considered when policies that would influence
managed-care growth are evaluated. In addition, scrutiny should be
given to studies that examine differences between utilization and
outcomes of managed-care and nonmanaged-care patients, because
managed care may induce changes in these variables for non-
managed-care patients as well.Managed Care and Health Care Expenditures 147
Second, spillover effects associated directly with Medicare HMO
market share are likely to be small. Updating previous work revealed
that increases in Medicare HMO market share are associated with
increases in Part A expenditures, the opposite of previous findings.
Because the Medicare HMO market share coefficients capture the
effects of selection bias as well as any spillover effects, these findings
suggest that biased selection's expenditure-increasing effects are sub-
stantially larger than any expenditure-decreasing spillover effects.
Our more recent results may differ from previous results for a
number of reasons. The importance of Medicare-specific spillovers for
Part A expenditures may have diminished over time to the point
where they are no longer a strong force. As a second possibility,
selection bias may have become stronger over time. A third possibility
stems from the relationship between Medicare and systemwide HMO
market share. If Medicare market share was better correlated with
systemwide HMO market share in the 1980s than in the 1990s, then the
Medicare HMO market share coefficients in the earlier studies may
have reflected systemwide spillover effects to a greater degree. In the
presence of expenditure-reducing systemwide spifiovers, this could
have caused studies using Medicare market share to show an expen-
diture-decreasing effect in earlier years when in fact the real action was
systemwide.
It is difficult to evaluate the relative strengths of these possible
explanations, and further study of them will be necessary. We did
explore the possibility that the correlation between Medicare and
systemwide market share has changed over time. Because geographi-
cally detailed data on systemwide market shares are not available for
the 1980s, we used state-level data to examine the correlation between
the 1986-90 change in Medicare and systemwide market share, and
compared it to the correlation between the 1990-94 changes in Medi-
care and systemwide market share. For the earlier time period, the
correlation is 0.27, whereas for the latter time period, the correlation is
0.20. Although neither of these correlations is very high, they do leave
open the possibility that some of the difference in the results is due to
a reduction in the extent to which Medicare HMO market share prox-
ies systemwide market share.
Regardless of the cause, these findings suggest that conclusions
about Medicare-specific spillovers for Part A expenditures drawn from
previous studies that used Medicare-specific lIMO market share may148 Laurence C. Baker and Sharmila Shankarkumar
substantially overstate actual spilovers. This finding does not prove
that Medicare market share has no associated spillover effect, only that
any spilover effect that is present is smaller than other expenditure-
increasing effects associated with increasing Medicare market share
(e.g., selection bias).
For Part B expenditures, we find evidence consistent with the pres-
ence of spillover effects that are associated with Medicare market
share. But holding systemwide market share constant, the magnitude
of these results is much smaller than the effect of Medicare market
share observed in models that do not include systemwide market
share. Our results imply that increases in market share may be associ-
ated with decreases in expenditures on the order of 1 to 2% after
controlling for systemwide market share, whereas earlier models that
did not control for systemwide market share reported results generally
at least twice as large.
The existence of a spillover effect that stems directly from Medicare
HMO market share is interesting, given the relative weakness of the
financial incentives within Medicare. Learning spillovers or other phe-
nomena may occur between physicians treating the elderly that are
confined to the Medicare world. Further investigation of the source of
this finding will be needed.
Taken broadly, these results suggest that managed care transforms
the functioning of the entire health care system. But in the context of
Medicare reform discussions, these results suggest that caution should
be exercised before relying on spillover effects to generate savings
from increases in Medicare HMO market share. Although our results
do not rule out the possibility of spillovers directly associated with
increasing Medicare market share, they suggest that the effect may be
much smaller than has been previously thought. The presence of a
systemwide spuflover effect, to which changes in Medicare HIMO mar-
ket share could contribute, does suggest that Medicare HMO market
share can have spillover effects but that the impact of a change in
Medicare market share may be limited by the role of Medicare HMO
activity within the broader scope of systemwide HMO activity.
Appendix A: Computing the Effect of a Change in Medicare HMO
Market Share for Equation (4.2).
Let Pm and P0 denote the number of people in an area who are in
Medicare and not in Medicare, respectively, and Em and E0 denoteManaged Care and Health Care Expenditures 149
HMO enrollment among Medicare beneficiaries and the rest of the
population, respectively.Then, we can write M=(Em/Pm) and
S(Em+Eo)/(Pm+Po). The regression coefficients 3 and 12 capture part
of the effect of increasing Medicare HMO market share. To separate
out the effect of Medicare HMO market share, we write out the









That is,i and2 determine the effect of an increase in Medicare
market share, and they incorporate f3j andalong with scaled com-
ponents reflecting the effects of systemwide market share 13i and 132,
where the scaling factor is the proportion of the population in Medi-
care. In 1994, approximately 12.4% of the population was enrolled in
Medicare, and the implementations of these formulas used in the
paper use this value. Using ö and 2 in place of f3 and13k,estimated
percent changes in expenditures associated with given changes in
Medicare HMO market share can be obtained using equation (4.3) in
the text.
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